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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Institutional Adaptation to Water Scarcity 
 
in Utah Irrigation Companies 
 
 
by 
 
 
Grant Patty, Master of Science 
 
Utah State University, 2018 
 
 
Major Professor: Dr. Randy T. Simmons 
Department: Economics 
 
A review of how water institutions in the American West have changed in 
response to arid conditions as a means of examining the possibility of further change as 
an adaptation to climate change induced water scarcity. Two institutions are examined, 
prior appropriation and shares. 
While much of the American West operates under prior appropriation formally, 
irrigators have found Coasian methods of lowering transaction costs by forming irrigation 
companies. Irrigation companies own appropriative rights and redefine them, typically as 
shares. Lower transaction costs allow irrigators to trade more freely within companies, 
though trades between companies still face high transaction costs. 
Using a dataset of Utah’s 1100+ irrigation companies collected from the Utah 
Division of Water Rights, I measure the extent to which these companies have 
internalized transaction costs. Because most, if not all, irrigation companies transform 
appropriative rights into some form of shares, regions facing more water scarcity should 
be more likely to manage water by using shares rather than appropriative rights. I test the 
hypothesis that an increase in water scarcity makes trade more valuable and thereby 
increases the relative opportunity costs of managing a river through appropriative rights 
versus shares.             (40 pages)  
  
iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 
 I’d like to thank the members of my committee, Professors Randy Simmons, Eric 
Edwards, and Quyen Nguyen, for their patience and willingness to guide me toward 
questions that were both interesting and answerable. I’d also like to thank the Center for 
Growth and Opportunity at Utah State University for financial support, including funding 
the opportunity to present an early version of this paper at a Mercatus Center conference 
celebrating the life and legacy of Douglass North. 
I’d also like to thank my many friends and colleagues who were willing to listen 
to my half-baked ideas, help refine my arguments, and even look over my drafts, 
including Josh Smith, Arthur Wardle, Camille Harmer, Brian Isom, Megan Hansen, and 
Jake Cottle. Your friendship and support were essential to my entire graduate experience. 
Grant Patty 
  
  
v 
CONTENTS 
 
                                                                                                                                      Page 
ABSTRACT  ...................................................................................................................... iii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  ................................................................................................ iv 
LIST OF FIGURES  .......................................................................................................... vi 
INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1 
INSTITUTIONS FOR GOVERNING WATER .................................................................2 
How Institutions Change .......................................................................................2 
How Water Institutions Have Evolved  ................................................................ 4 
Riparian Rights  .....................................................................................................4 
Prior Appropriation ...............................................................................................5 
Water Shares ..........................................................................................................7 
TRANSATION COSTS OF PRIOR APPROPRIATION .................................................10 
HOW IRRIGATION COMPANIES 
  INTERNALIZE TRANSACTION COSTS ..................................................................13 
METHODOLOGY  ...........................................................................................................16 
RESULTS  .........................................................................................................................26 
DISCUSSION  ...................................................................................................................28 
CONCLUSION  .................................................................................................................32 
REFERENCES  .................................................................................................................33 
  
  
vi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 Table                                                                                                                              Page 
 1 Utah Counties Summary Statistics ...............................................................17 
 2 Average County Acre-feet per Company, County HHI Defined as Acre-feet, 
and County HHI Defined as Acreage  ..........................................................22 
 3 Average County Acre-feet per Company .....................................................23 
 4 County HHI Defined as Acre-feet ................................................................24 
 5 County HHI Defined as Acreage ..................................................................25 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
“The Coasean solution to a Coasean property rights problem is the firm, and the 
settlers of the West turned to the firm [...] to reduce transaction costs associated with 
irrigation.” (Bretsen & Hill, 2006, p. 286) 
 “By the very act of organizing into larger groups, individuals can often gain 
considerable political power over state and federal water policy.” (Thompson, 1993, p. 
681) 
 
Much of the literature on water institutions in the American West has focused on 
both the innovative efficiencies and path-dependent inefficiencies of prior appropriation 
(Johnson, Gisser, & Werner, 1981; Libecap, 2007, 2011; Leonard & Libecap, 2017; 
Edwards & Libecap, 2015; Heinmiller, 2009). The transaction costs from beneficial use 
and multiple owners of return flows have been well documented (Burness & Quirk, 1979, 
1980; Bretsen & Hill, 2009). A focus on how the formal, legal institutions that govern 
water impose transaction costs is incomplete without examining how irrigators have 
innovated institutional arrangements that reduce these transaction costs. The most 
important of these institutional arrangements are irrigation companies and irrigation 
districts. 
Although some scholars have turned their attention to irrigation companies and 
districts, there is a lack of quantitative work that tests how these institutions have been 
created as a response to the arid conditions that increase the transaction costs of prior 
appropriation. The following is a test of the hypothesis that irrigators in Utah have 
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created institutions that reduce transaction costs as a response to the state’s arid climate. 
The empirical analysis presented here offers evidence that this is the case. 
INSTITUTIONS FOR GOVERNING WATER 
 
How Institutions Change 
 
Like other resources, water is managed through institutions, which Nobel 
Laureate Douglass North (1991) defined as the “humanly devised constraints that 
structure political, economic and social interaction” (p. 97). Institutions that manage 
water structure how people are able to obtain, use, and trade water. Property rights, like 
other institutions, are often established out of a need to encourage investment by reducing 
uncertainty over who has the right to use resources. Frequently, the process of 
establishing of property rights involves negotiation and contracting among the many 
users of the resource (Libecap, 1989). In other cases, property rights are imposed by 
higher-level institutions.  
The outcome of this process can produce long-lasting constraints on the plausible 
choices available to future users of the resource. North (1990) argues that institutions can 
have considerable staying power as people adapt to them. Adaptation includes learning 
how the institution works and what opportunities are available. Entrepreneurs, both 
economic and political, pursue opportunities afforded by current institutions. When these 
opportunities depend on the continued existence of the institutions that created them, 
entrepreneurs can become vested interests who devote resources into preserving the 
institutional status quo. This process of institutions creating space for interests that 
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protect them can make long-standing institutions exceptionally difficult to change, a state 
often termed “institutional lock-in” (Garrick, Whitten, & Coggan, 2013; North, 1990). 
When change does come, it is frequently sparked by changes that come from 
outside the institutions themselves. These changes can be described as price shocks, 
because they change the opportunity cost, or price, of preserving the institutional status 
quo. Potential sources of price shocks can include new technologies, climate and 
environmental change, or demographic and cultural shifts. When the potential 
opportunities offered by alternative institutions become greater than the costs of 
maintaining current institutions, entrepreneurs have an incentive to invest in institutional 
change (Edwards & Libecap, 2015).  
Importantly, it is not enough for alternative institutions to offer superior sets of 
opportunities. The benefits of the new institutions must be greater than the benefits 
offered by current institutions after the costs of transitioning to the new institution are 
accounted for. Institutional “lock-in” can substantially increase the costs of changing 
institutions (Garrick, Whitten, & Coggan, 2013). 
Institutional change is difficult to achieve and there is no guarantee that it will be 
beneficial. Considerations of costs and benefits to change only matter to those who have 
the ability to cause change, or in price terms, those who can afford to invest in the costs 
of changing the institution. The public choice model of “politics as exchange” illustrates 
that lower-level institutional change, when pursued within a set of political institutions, is 
subject to the constraints imposed by politics. This leaves open the real possibility that 
price shocks may not always lead to beneficial institutional change when short-sighted 
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policymakers, an uninformed public, and vested interest groups have the ability to exploit 
price shocks for their own benefit. 
 
 
 
How Water Institutions Have Evolved 
 
Property rights over water have been the primary institution used to allocate water 
resources in the American West. Property rights can be defined in many different ways, 
however, and not all ways of defining them are equally well suited to every 
environmental or economic goal. Accordingly, how water rights are defined matters a 
great deal in determining how people will use, or not use, water resources, which in turn 
determines how their economies and communities grow and develop. 
Property rights over water have taken many forms, but three ways of defining 
water rights, riparian rights, appropriative rights, and water shares, have been used widely 
throughout the English-speaking world. Accordingly, these three institutions will be 
compared here. The effects of path dependence mean that understanding the possibility of 
institutional change requires understanding how these institutions were developed in the 
first place. Two regions are particularly instructive, the American West and Australia’s 
Murray-Darling Basin, as both redefined property rights over water from riparian rights 
to either appropriative rights or water shares (Heinmiller, 2009). The different approaches 
taken by each country resulted in differing abilities to capture gains from trade (Grafton, 
Libecap, Edwards, O’Brian, & Landry, 2012) and respond to drought (Garrick, Whitten, 
& Coggan, 2013). 
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Riparian Rights 
 
Riparian rights are a fairly simple way to structure water use. Under this 
institution, anyone who owns land adjacent to a stream has the right to withdraw as much 
water as they need from a stream so long as they do not impact the ability of other 
similarly-adjacent users to do the same. Riparian rights were developed in the relatively 
wet climate of England and are a traditional feature of English common law. As the 
British colonized other parts of the world, including Australia and North America, they 
brought with them their legal institutions, including riparian rights. 
 In a climate where water is abundant, riparian rights can work fairly well. If 
precipitation is frequent and bodies of water are common, then most users will have 
access to ample water. In more arid regions, however, the requirement that all water users 
be adjacent to the source of the water they use makes riparian rights ill-suited for 
economic growth and development. This was the problem faced by the colonizers of the 
American West. While the eastern United States had enough water abundance for 
riparian rights to be viable, the arid western landscape did not. Precipitation was rare, 
rivers were few and far between, and water was often needed far from where it was 
available. In response, the colonizers developed a new institution, prior appropriation, 
which evolved from private decentralized agreements that eventually were formally 
codified. 
Prior Appropriation 
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Property rights for water, as defined by prior appropriation, guarantee the owner a 
fixed volume of water (typically measured in acre-feet1) so long as all others whose rights 
have priority receive their full allocation first. The priority of these rights is ordered by 
seniority, in the order in which they were established by diverting water from the source. 
Along a given source of water, such as a river, rights that were created from early 
diversions are referred to as “senior” water rights, and those that were created from later 
diversion are referred to as “junior” water rights. Because those at the front of the line 
receive their full quantity first, they are generally likely to receive their allocation even 
under drought conditions, while those at the end may be lucky to ever see any water at 
all. 
Gary Libecap, and others, have extensively traced the origins of prior 
appropriation rights in the American west (Libecap, 2007; Libecap, 2011; Leonard & 
Libecap, 2017). Early colonizers of the western US faced climate and governance 
conditions entirely unlike what they had experienced in the eastern half of the country. 
The semi-arid climate required diverting water to where it would be used, often over long 
distances. This was especially true for industries like mining, where water was needed far 
from the only available sources. Not surprisingly, miners were some of the first water 
users to abandon riparian rights in favor of prior appropriation. 
The change from riparian rights to prior appropriation was rapid and greatly 
contributed to the American West’s economic development. Prior appropriation gave 
entrepreneurs confidence that investments they made would be secure. It allowed the 
creation of contracts and trade among the new colonizers, facilitating discovery of the 
                                                 
1 An acre-foot is enough water to cover an acre of land in a foot of water, or about 325,851 gallons. 
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most productive uses of the region’s natural resources (Leonard & Libecap, 2017). As 
more people moved to the region, emerging state governments codified prior 
appropriation rights, endowing the privately developed institution with the force of law. 
Water Shares 
 
The British colonizers of Australia faced similar challenges as the those in the 
American West. Riparian rights were not a useful way to define property rights in the dry 
climate of Australia. Change only materialized after a number of factors came together in 
the 19th century, including urban populations unable to easily obtain the water they 
needed through riparian rights, rural settlers facing conflicts over who had the right to use 
water, and miners making heavy use of water in the mid-century gold rush (Ward, 2009).  
These conflicts came to a head in the 1886 Irrigation Act, which granted each 
state full ownership and control over water within its boundaries. The act rejected both 
riparian rights and prior appropriation, which had been established in the western US by 
this time, in favor of centralized administration of water (Ward, 2009). Users were 
granted privileges, known as entitlements, to appropriate a certain percentage of the 
yearly flow, but were unable to sell or trade these entitlements without also selling the 
land where the water was used. States issued entitlements to private individuals and 
organizations guided by an explicit goal of maximum water resource utilization and 
economic development (National Water Commission, 2011).  
Prior appropriation was developed in the mid 19th century before state and federal 
governments had the ability to project power and enforce contracts over the large areas of 
the west. The relatively low enforcement costs required by prior appropriation made it an 
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attractive institution. In contrast, Australia remained a British colony during this time and 
did not reform its institution of riparian rights until the end of the 19th century. By that 
time the government had the ability to monitor water usage, and could therefore 
centralize water allocation, something that was not possible in the middle of the century 
in western North America. 
An Australian-style, centralized institution in the American West was unlikely, 
given the conditions and technology available at the time of its colonization. As Libecap 
(2011) notes, “Defining water rights in terms of shares rather than in fixed, diverted 
quantities would have required knowledge of total flows, information only more recently 
available” (p. 76).  In Northian terms, defining property rights over water as a percentage 
of the seasonal flow, as Australia did, did not lie within the American West’s 
“opportunity set”.  
The decentralized property rights developed in the American West differed 
fundamentally from the centralized institutions developed in Australia’s Murray-Darling 
basin. After abandoning riparian rights, the new Australian “rights” were not really rights 
at all, and their name, entitlements, reflected this. They did not allow the owner to 
modify, sell, or exchange them without also modifying, selling, or exchanging the land to 
which the rights were attached. They were little more than the permission for an owner of 
a particular piece of land to use a certain amount of water on that land (National Water 
Commission, 2011). American water rights, on the other hand, often separated the 
ownership of land from the use of water. While American water rights remained 
usufructuary, they could be modified, sold, and exchanged separately from the land on 
which they were used. 
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 Eventually a series of intense droughts combined with diminishing returns from 
additional dams forced Australia to change water entitlements to water shares. This was 
accomplished through a series of reforms that unbundled water use from land and 
encouraged trade. The modern Australian water market is now one of the most active in 
the world. It is unlikely that Australia’s successful wholesale institutional transformation 
can be replicated in the American West, however. Australia’s National Water 
Commission (2011) has noted that the centralized institution of water resource 
management became “a significant precursor to the later establishment of clearly 
specified and tradable water entitlements because it gave government the power to limit 
total extractions and to define relatively homogenous rights to the resource” (p. 20). A 
complete transformation to a water market based on shares may be more difficult when 
“each right is different and location-specific,” (National Water Commission, 2011, p. 20) 
as are rights in the American West. 
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TRANSACTION COSTS OF  
PRIOR APPROPRIATION 
 
Adaptation of the American West’s water institutions happened in a much more 
local, private way, than Australia’s complete overhaul. Institutional change was driven by 
incentives to reduce the transaction costs inherited from prior appropriation. These costs 
include unequal distribution of risks from drought, rules allowing third-party users to 
block changes in water use if it would affect their water right, and in some cases, the 
legal doctrine of beneficial use. The primary way these issues have been addressed is by 
associations of users contracting to form private irrigation companies, and later by voting 
to form public irrigation districts. These organizations purchased appropriative rights and 
redefined them, typically as shares. Redefining appropriative rights to shares alleviated 
many of the transaction costs inherent in prior appropriation, at least within the 
organizations. Consequently, water trade in the American West within irrigation 
companies and districts (where transaction costs have been internalized) is more common 
in than the formal rules of prior appropriation allow (Grafton, Libecap, Edwards, 
O’Brian, & Landry, 2012).  
Beneficial use, colloquially known as “use-it-or-lose-it”, stipulates that water can 
only be used for a “beneficial” use as defined by the state. This was originally developed 
to protect from speculators diverting an entire water source with the sole intention of 
selling it back to later users at a monopolistic price. If a user does not put their water right 
toward a use that the state designates as beneficial, the state revokes the right. This has 
the unintentional effect of encouraging wasteful uses of water and discouraging 
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investments in efficiency, as water users cannot sell the water saved through conservation 
efforts. 
Because under prior appropriation water rights are prioritized in order of 
seniority, holders of junior rights face more risk from drought than holders of senior 
rights (Burness & Quirk, 1979; Burness & Quirk, 1980). Shares, on the other hand do not 
face this problem. While allowing competitive markets under prior appropriation can 
theoretically, in the long-run, see users trading this risk in a way that results in the same 
risk distribution as shares, other aspects of prior appropriation, including rules that 
protect holders of rights from third-party effects, make this uncommon in practice 
(Johnson, Gisser, & Werner, 1981).  
 The inability to trade stems primarily from users that have rights over return 
flows. Most uses of water do not consume all, or even most, of the resource. Water that is 
not consumed generally flows back to the source from which it was diverted. Other 
appropriators can then divert the return flows back from the source and incorporate it as 
part of their own water right. If the original appropriator changes their use of water, by 
selling it to another user, for example, any user whose right includes the return flows will 
lose their use of that water, and is therefore legally entitled to challenge the sale. As the 
American West developed over time, many overlapping and interconnected rights were 
created. This has been described as a “tragedy of the anticommons” (Bretsen & Hill, 
2009), in which many users all have a property right over the same resource, preventing 
any change from occurring without the consent of all users. 
There is likely no single best approach to overcome this problem. While one 
possible solution is to redefine water rights from the amount diverted to the amount 
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consumed, this may encourage users to engage in uses that consume more water, and as 
environmental law scholar Barton H. Thompson Jr. (1993) notes, “states would need to 
calculate the return flows of all water rights immediately in order to quantify the 
consumptive rights - a tremendous administrative chore that no state would want to 
undertake without a compelling reason” (p. 707). 
Much of the water literature has focused on changing the formal rules of the 
game, such as eliminating beneficial use requirements, for example. Unfortunately, these 
reforms are surface-level, and do not consider how local institutional innovations have 
circumvented the formal limitations on water markets (Thompson, 1993). It remains a 
possibility that in regions that have largely internalized the transaction costs of prior 
appropriation, that legal reforms, while potentially beneficial, could do little to change 
the actual opportunities and constraints faced by water users. 
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HOW IRRIGATION COMPANIES  
INTERNALIZE TRANSACTION COSTS 
 
American water rights began as a decentralized system of property rights, and 
cannot easily transition to the more efficient institution of shares as a result. As Libecap 
(2011) argues about the western American development of water institutions:  
The institutions that emerged to facilitate agriculture in response to the 
region’s aridity raise the costs today of reallocating water to higher-valued 
uses and of flexibly responding to hydrological uncertainty due to climate 
change [...] these institutional restrictions on markets illustrate how past 
arrangements to meet conditions of the time constrain contemporary 
economic opportunities. They cannot be easily significantly modified or 
replaced ex post. (p. 66) 
 
Furthermore, Edwards and Libecap (2015) argue that “A shift from prior appropriation to 
shares is unlikely to be widespread in the US West unless water becomes much more 
valuable” (p. 468), and that “Only when the costs of the current arrangement become so 
high that the status quo is no longer tenable will the rights system be changed 
voluntarily” (p. 469). This is why obstacles to trade have been primarily overcome in a 
decentralized way through the formation of irrigation companies. 
The first private organizations to develop irrigation infrastructure were what 
Bretsen and Hill (2006) refer to as “commercial” irrigation companies. They were often 
speculative ventures that invested heavily in constructing the infrastructure required to 
irrigate an area, with the expectation of charging monopolistic prices to the future 
irrigators that would settle on the land served by the infrastructure. Commercial irrigation 
companies were frequently backed by Eastern investors with little knowledge or expertise 
in the difficulties of Western irrigation. As farmers began irrigating with water purchased 
from commercial irrigation companies, many of these companies began to charge 
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exorbitant fees or engage in predatory business practices toward those whom they 
believed were captive customers. Bretsen and Hill (2006) cite an observer who noted that 
commercial irrigation companies could sell land to a farmer, provide water while the 
farmer improved their property for a few years, briefly cut off water to kill the farmer’s 
crop, and then confiscate and resell the improved property when the farmer failed to 
make their water payments. These short-term practices eventually destroyed commercial 
irrigation companies when their customers realized they had both monopsony power to 
refuse to purchase water, and political power to effectively outlaw commercial irrigation 
companies (Bretsen & Hill, 2006). 
Commercial irrigation companies financed much of the irrigation infrastructure 
that developed the American West, but collapsed when they were unable to efficiently 
manage and operate their own irrigation systems. In an effort to overcome the free-rider 
problems that came with irrigation infrastructure, farmers formed mutual irrigation 
companies to construct, maintain, and administer that infrastructure. Bretsen and Hill 
(2006) argue that mutual irrigation companies were successful at “reducing or 
eliminating transaction costs in areas where the commercial irrigation company had 
failed” (p. 302). Mutual irrigation companies (referred to as simply “irrigation 
companies” for the remainder of this paper) acquired appropriative water rights, either 
from other companies or from the members themselves, and redefined those rights as 
shares. These shares often did, and still do, represent a single acre-foot of water that can 
be traded freely. Thompson (1993) notes that irrigation companies with plentiful water 
supplies are more likely to have regulations that can discourage trade, but as water 
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becomes scarcer, or as the opportunity costs of not allowing trade increases, they tend to 
find innovative ways of lowering transaction costs. 
Thompson (1993) argues that two important characteristics of irrigation 
companies drove their adoption: ownership by the water users and vertical integration. 
Local control enabled the water users to incorporate local knowledge about their region’s 
particular geographic, climatic, or social attributes in their custom-designed “rules of the 
game”. Vertical integration, an ownership structure where the users of water are also the 
owners of the infrastructure that delivers it, allowed irrigators to avoid facing potential 
monopoly pricing from the only source of nearby irrigation. 
Towards the beginning of the 20th century, irrigators began to form, with the 
blessing of state and local governments, larger public organizations known as irrigation 
districts. Irrigation districts had many of the features of mutual irrigation companies but 
with added powers that included “eminent domain, the power of taxation, the power to 
issue bonds, and exemptions from state and federal income taxes” (Bretsen & Hill, 2006, 
p. 316). As the federal Bureau of Reclamation began constructing large irrigation 
projects, including dams and pipelines, it contracted with irrigation districts who gained 
exclusive distribution rights to Reclamation water. Today, irrigation districts deliver 
water to both individual water users and to irrigation companies who then reallocate the 
water to their members. 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
My hypothesis is that irrigation companies will have control over more water in 
regions that are more arid. Theoretical work by Burness and Quirk (1979; 1980) and 
Johnson, Gisser, and Werner (1981) demonstrated that, along a river managed by prior 
appropriation, an increase in water scarcity increases both the value of trade and the 
relative opportunity costs of managing a river through appropriative rights rather than 
through shares. Because most, if not all, irrigation companies transform appropriative 
rights into some form of shares, regions facing more water scarcity should be more likely 
to manage water by using shares rather than appropriative rights. In other words, because 
the transaction costs of prior appropriation are greater in more arid regions, these same 
regions should have internalized transaction costs to a greater extent.  
I use a series of OLS regressions to test if this is the case. To do this, I use three 
dependent variables. The first is the average acre-feet owned by a company in a county, 
and the second and third are market concentration indices defined in terms of acre-feet 
and irrigated acres, respectively. The independent variable of interest is the yearly 
average precipitation in a county.  
Utah has 29 counties. All data was aggregated by county, so each county is a 
single observation in the following tests. Summary statistics for Utah can be found in 
table 1. 
  
  
17 
Table 1 
 
Utah Counties Summary Statistics 
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
 
Precipitation 29 19.307 9.181 6.560 47.140 
Population 29 101,472.500 225,743.800 1,117 1,091,742 
Acre-feet per Company 29 3,877.724 5,691.112 0.000 25,898.130 
Acre-feet - HHI 29 5,089.620 3,233.563 0.000 10,000.000 
Acreage - HHI 29 4,825.514 3,493.896 0.000 10,000.000 
Subsidy per Farm 29 8,007.724 4,192.045 2,371 20,572 
Farm Sales 29 116,528.000 190,123.800 17,906 1,041,519 
Median Farm Size 29 75.103 114.081 6 623 
Farm Value 29 994,920.800 442,714.100 452,336 2,606,137 
Acre Value 29 2,428.138 1,636.627 374 6,484 
BoR Projects 29 0.828 1.537 0 6 
      
 
 
The three dependent variables were derived from data collected from the Utah 
Division of Water Rights database of irrigation companies. Each irrigation company has 
a page on which several attributes of the company are recorded, including the county (or 
counties) and water right area (or areas) in which they operate. Also included are the 
main source of the company’s water, the number of irrigated acres serviced by the 
company, the number of shares issued, the contact information for the operators and 
owners of the company, and a list of all water rights owned by the company.  
Attributes of the individual water rights include the priority date, source, and 
amount, defined as either a quantity (acre-feet) or flow (defined as cubic feet per second). 
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The total acre-feet or CFS controlled by a company can be calculated by adding these 
rights together.  
Frequently, an irrigation company’s DWR page will contain comments from 
DWR employees. These comments often spell out the unique forms of governance used 
by the company. The DWR also occasionally indicates if a company has been sold to 
another company or is defunct. Utah has roughly 1100 irrigation companies, but almost 
half of these companies are listed as owning no rights, issuing no shares, and irrigating 
zero acres. I did not include these companies in the calculations to create the dependent 
variable. Also omitted from the data were the eight irrigation companies that span more 
than one county.  
The three dependent variables are intended to test how much irrigation companies 
in a county have internalized transaction costs. Because this is difficult to observe 
directly, I use three dependent variables as proxies for transaction cost internalization. 
The first dependent variable, acre-feet per company, was calculated by adding the acre-
feet of every irrigation company in a county and then dividing that by the total number of 
irrigation companies in that county. In other words, this variable measures the average 
quantity of water (defined as acre-feet) controlled by an irrigation company in a county. 
If it is the case that as this measure increases that transaction costs have been more 
internalized, then this variable can serve as a proxy. 
The second and third dependent variables are based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI), a common measure of market concentration. It works by taking the market 
share of all companies in an industry (40% market share = 40, for example), squaring 
them, and then adding them. The final value is a number between 0 and 10,000. Values 
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between 1,500 and 2,500 are considered by the US Justice Department to be "moderately 
concentrated", and values greater than 2,500 are considered "highly concentrated" 
(United States Department of Justice, 2015). 
Two HHIs are used as the second and third dependent variables. One defines 
market share as the percentage of acre-feet controlled by an irrigation company in a 
county, and the other defines market share as the percentage of irrigated acreage in a 
country that is served by an irrigation company. The market shares of each irrigation 
company in a county are then squared and summed to create a total HHI for the county. 
In the context of irrigation companies, if a higher HHI value is correlated with a higher 
degree of internalization of transaction costs, then these variables can serve as proxies. In 
other words, the more concentrated the market for water is in a few irrigation companies, 
the more transaction costs of prior appropriation have been internalized. 
The main independent variable of interest, precipitation, was calculated by adding 
the monthly average precipitation in a county to get a yearly total average. Snow inches 
were converted to rain inches by dividing the total by 10, a commonly accepted 
conversion rate (Madaus, 2010). This is the variable of interest because a negative 
relationship between precipitation and the three previously discussed implies an 
association between aridity and the need to internalize the transaction costs of prior 
appropriation.  
The other independent variables are the population of each county; subsidy per 
farm, or the value in government funds received by the average farm in the county; the 
median farm size, in acres; farm sales, or the value of sales of all agricultural products for 
the average farm in a county; the estimated total value of the average farm in a county, 
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including land and building values; and the estimated value of the average farm acre in a 
county, also including land and building values and finally, the number of dams built by 
the Bureau of Reclamation in a county. 
Population was chosen as an independent variable because counties tended to be 
settled in greater numbers when they had more water available. This data was collected 
from the State of Utah’s 2014 estimates (Governor’s Office of Management and Budget, 
2015). The number of dams built by the Bureau of Reclamation was included because 
irrigation companies may depend on Reclamation water through contracts with irrigation 
districts. This data was collected from the Bureau of Reclamation (Bureau of 
Reclamation, 2018). 
The financial variables, including subsidy per farm, median farm value, farm 
sales, farm value, and acre value are all intended to test for an association with the value 
of farms in particular regions with irrigation company control of water. It is possible that 
the value of farms in a region motivate the internalization of transaction costs, not 
precipitation. Finally, the median farm size is included because some agricultural activity, 
such as cattle ranching, can require less water but more land, which may affect the 
decision to place water in under the control of irrigation companies. The financial and 
farm size data was collected from the USDA 2012 Census of Agriculture (United States 
Department of Agriculture, 2012). 
Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 are regression tables that show the results of these tests. 
Table 2 shows all three dependent variables regressed against all of the independent 
variables. Table 3 shows eight regressions with the dependent variable acre-feet per 
company and the independent variable precipitation, along with a single additional 
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independent variable. This process is repeated in tables 4 and 5, with the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) defined in terms of acre-feet as the dependent variable in table 4, 
and the HHI defined in terms of acreage as the dependent variable in table 5. Robust 
standard errors were used in all regressions. 
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Table 2 
 
Average County Acre-feet per Company, County HHI Defined as Acre-feet, and County HHI 
Defined as Acreage  
 
  
 Acre-feet per Company Acre-feet - HHI Acreage - HHI 
 
Precipitation -329.353** -121.586** -140.134* 
 (124.259) (57.105) (72.686) 
    
Population 0.004 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Subsidy per Farm 0.218 0.139 -0.125 
 (0.253) (0.196) (0.219) 
    
Median Farm Size -7.701 0.626 -9.511 
 (10.696) (5.820) (6.600) 
    
Farm Sales -0.007 0.005** -0.005** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
    
Farm Value -0.003 -0.003* 0.005** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
    
Acre Value -0.807 -0.275 0.159 
 (0.838) (0.316) (0.402) 
    
BoR Projects 386.213 -474.667* -756.841** 
 (428.588) (242.060) (325.433) 
    
Constant 13,647.590*** 9,974.389*** 5,806.062*** 
 (4,693.480) (1,987.600) (1,770.344) 
    
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
  
 
  
Table 3 
Average County Acre-feet per Company 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Precipitation -258.469** -269.470** -258.999** -289.705** -318.832** -290.611** -237.473** -279.940** 
 (114.327) (119.858) (117.726) (127.447) (128.598) (122.545) (107.649) (104.732) 
         
Population  0.002       
  (0.001)       
         
Subsidy per Farm   -0.016      
   (0.180)      
         
Median Farm Size    -10.519*     
    (5.372)     
         
Farm Sales     -0.010**    
     (0.004)    
         
Farm Value      -0.003***   
      (0.001)   
         
Acre Value       -0.328  
       (0.544)  
         
BoR Projects        554.434* 
        (300.888) 
         
Constant 8,867.960*** 8,909.508*** 9,010.185** 10,261.050*** 11,191.430*** 12,796.330*** 9,259.259** 8,823.660*** 
 (3,017.212) (3,094.952) (3,555.811) (3,558.769) (3,542.739) (3,905.613) (3,347.615) (3,000.781) 
         
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
2
3
 
  
 
  
Table 4 
County HHI Defined as Acre-feet 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Precipitation -180.147*** -163.815*** -179.059*** -182.341*** -161.766*** -188.299*** -162.679*** -164.100*** 
 (47.837) (46.633) (48.818) (50.709) (50.583) (49.950) (51.009) (52.305) 
         
Population  -0.002*       
  (0.001)       
         
Subsidy per Farm   0.034      
   (0.135)      
         
Median Farm Size    -0.739     
    (3.425)     
         
Farm Sales     0.003**    
     (0.001)    
         
Farm Value      -0.001   
      (0.001)   
         
Acre Value       -0.273  
       (0.265)  
         
BoR Projects        -414.363* 
        (233.959) 
         
Constant 8,567.702*** 8,506.016*** 8,275.527*** 8,665.561*** 7,860.200*** 9,563.975*** 8,893.244*** 8,600.810*** 
 (1,082.186) (1,055.738) (1,448.820) (1,212.795) (1,266.321) (1,481.946) (1,233.457) (1,132.598) 
         
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
2
4
 
  
 
Table 5 
County HHI Defined as Acreage 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Precipitation -151.515*** -145.370*** -151.830*** -150.525*** -162.688*** -135.163** -145.080** -128.331** 
 (50.881) (51.733) (50.500) (52.681) (53.951) (52.768) (58.635) (56.505) 
         
Population  -0.001       
  (0.001)       
         
Subsidy per Farm   -0.010      
   (0.132)      
         
Median Farm Size    0.333     
    (3.707)     
         
Farm Sales     -0.002    
     (0.002)    
         
Farm Value      0.002*   
      (0.001)   
         
Acre Value       -0.101  
       (0.337)  
         
BoR Projects        -598.653** 
        (248.463) 
         
Constant 7,750.798*** 7,727.587*** 7,835.398*** 7,706.633*** 8,180.877*** 5,752.196*** 7,870.722*** 7,798.631*** 
 (1,139.275) (1,149.388) (1,290.042) (1,252.833) (1,278.526) (1,603.312) (1,227.985) (1,172.905) 
         
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
2
5
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RESULTS 
 
In every regression, precipitation is negatively correlated with the dependent variables, 
meaning that a decrease in the average precipitation of a county is associated with an increase in 
the average acre-feet controlled by a company, as well as an increase in a county’s Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index defined in terms of acre-feet and acreage. Not all regressions show the same 
degree of significance, nor do they show the same magnitude of effect. All have the same 
direction for the coefficient on the precipitation variable, however, and in all cases but one the 
precipitation variable is significant to at least p<0.05, and in the single exception it is significant 
to p<0.1.  
The differences between the regressions appear to be mainly driven by the choice of 
dependent variable. The most robust dependent variable appears to be the HHI defined in terms 
of acre-feet, as all but one of the regressions that use this variable are significant to p<0.01. This 
result makes theoretical sense, as HHI defined in terms of acre-feet represents what is traded in 
irrigation companies (water), as opposed to HHI defined in terms of acreage. HHI defined in 
terms of acre-feet also makes use of a technique that places greater importance on the presence 
of large firms, as opposed to the dependent variable acre-feet per company, which is just a 
simple average. 
The results suggest that aridity may have an effect on the opportunity cost of prior 
appropriation relative to shares, and is empirical evidence that supports the conclusions of prior 
theoretical work suggesting that transaction costs increase under prior appropriation when water 
is scarce. This, however, is not the only possible explanation for the data. Ownership of water 
may be more concentrated in drier regions if water itself is more concentrated in a few sources. 
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A better statistical test would look at how ownership of water rights has changed over time, but 
historical streamflow data can be wildly inconsistent from year to year, and water rights data can 
be incomplete, making a time series analysis unlikely to yield meaningful results. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
 As stated earlier, irrigation companies have found many unique ways of internalizing the 
transaction costs associated with prior appropriation. While they typically redefine their water 
rights as shares, the particular rights associated with owning a share vary from company to 
company. Shares can represent a quantity of acre-feet, a percentage of a water source’s flow, or a 
quantity of time to access a source at a defined flow rate. Additionally, irrigation companies may 
have unique ways of allocating their water locally. 
 The Utah Division of Water Rights publishes information about each individual irrigation 
company, including occasional notes left by DWR employees that detail the unique ways that 
water rights are defined within the company. For example, in a note about the Ricks Creek 
Irrigation Company, an employee recounts a phone conversation with the company president:  
There are two sides to the creek: North and South. Weber Basin WCD owns most of the South side 
water. The LDS church owns some South side water, Bill Rigby owns 80 shares North side, his 
brother owns about 24 shares, or hours, North, or something like that. [...] George has some stock, 
probably 24 hours, but they can’t find the certificates (Utah Division of Water Rights, 2012). 
 
Local knowledge appears crucial to the management of some irrigation companies. This 
includes local knowledge about the layout of water infrastructure, as implied by this comment on 
the Henefer Irrigation Company: 
[T]he company`s shares are worth 3 acre-feet each; usually when someone hooks up to the city water 
they turn over a third of a share valued at 1 acre-foot; and the number of shares in the company is 975. 
[...] I see the slight inconsistency with this valuation compared to the 1157.5 acres the water right says 
it is worth, but I guess the difference is made up on the ground with the availability / unavailability of 
water and the need for some carriage water to stay in the ditches to the end of the line (Utah Division 
of Water Rights, 2011). 
 
Many companies issue shares that change depending on the streamflow, such as the East 
Bench Canal Company (Utah Division of Water Rights, 2014). Others issue different classes of 
shares with more or less exposure to drought risk, as does the La Sal Irrigation Company, whose 
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acre-feet per share amounts are dependent on the yearly runoff (Utah Division of Water Rights, 
2016a). Different classes of shares can also be defined for times of the year, as in the Indianola 
Irrigation Company, where, “Class A shares are entitled to receive water, if it is available, for the 
entire irrigation season. Class B shares are high water shares to divert early season flood water as 
it may be available without reducing the water allocated to the Class A shares” (Utah Division of 
Water Rights, 2016b). 
 The water source also matters for how the rights can be used. Bureau of Reclamation 
water is generally restricted to agricultural uses, as noted in this comment for the Enterprise and 
Stoddard Irrigation Company: 
Bench Canal Stock CANNOT be used for domestic, industrial, or municipal purposes. Bench Canal 
shares are based on Echo Reservoir storage, which has restrictive covenants under the Weber River 
Project (Bureau of Reclamation) to be used solely for agricultural purposes [...] Contrast this with 
Field Ditch shares, which are based on Weber River Decree 180 [...] and which may be changed more 
freely. (Utah Division of Water Rights, 2013) 
 
Irrigation companies that do not use Reclamation water are more able to sell their water 
to higher valued uses, including municipal and industrial users. Some irrigation companies have 
even been bought entirely by cities, such as the Granite Water Company, which was purchased 
by Sandy (an urban suburb of Salt Lake City) in 2010 (Utah Division of Water Rights, 2011). 
As urban populations grow, transfers of water from agricultural to urban users may 
become increasingly valuable. Libecap (2011) argues that if current projections of long-term 
decreased precipitation and snowpack due to climate change are correct, some form of adaptation 
will be necessary, and water markets, if they function well, should be able to mitigate water 
supply uncertainty. Transfers of water from agricultural to urban uses will be necessary to 
accommodate and encourage the significant economic and population growth of the American 
West. Thompson (1993) notes, however, that irrigation districts “have often opposed and 
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successfully blocked such trades” (p. 703). Blocked sales are generally more likely to occur in 
large irrigation districts where property rights are less clearly defined and less easily traded than 
in irrigation companies. 
The challenges of large irrigation districts that prevent their users from transferring water, 
often for political reasons, can be contrasted with the many irrigation companies that allow users 
who are not members to purchase their shares, which allows water to be transferred outside of 
the original set of irrigators who formed the company. Irrigation companies with this structure 
have allowed many transfers of water from agriculture to urban users, especially in Utah and 
Colorado (Thompson, 1993). Because water in an irrigation district is owned more collectively, 
an outside trade from an irrigation district may harm the other members of the district while only 
benefitting the seller. An irrigation company, however, internalizes both the profits and losses to 
buyers and sellers of shares (Thompson, 1993). 
Furthermore, the mechanisms by which outside trades can be prevented in irrigation 
companies and irrigation districts differ. In an irrigation company that allows the sale of shares to 
municipal users, for example, an irrigator who wishes to prevent an outside sale must purchase 
the share at the market price. In an irrigation district, however, an irrigator who wishes to prevent 
an outside sale only needs to vote to prevent it. Irrigators in an irrigation district may be able to 
prevent trades where the benefit to the irrigator of preventing the outside sale is less than the 
gains from trade to the seller and buyer, a situation unlikely to occur when irrigators are forced to 
face the full costs of preventing trade.  
If irrigation companies are indeed redefining appropriative rights as a response to water 
scarcity, then irrigation companies will likely continue to be important adaptive institutions in 
the event of climate change-induced water scarcity. Unfortunately, local resource governance 
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institutions can be threatened by policymakers who impose one-size-fits all solutions that crowd 
out, or even destroy local adaptations (Ostrom, 1990). Building additional water projects in an 
effort to overcome the problems of water scarcity may delay and obscure the price signals that 
irrigation companies rely on. This danger is made real by policymakers who face political 
incentives, rather than market incentives. Conspicuous structures of concrete and steel that hold 
back lakes or networks of pipelines that move water over, around, and through mountain ranges 
may provide policymakers with political benefits while simultaneously preventing local 
institutions from adapting to water scarcity. For example, Garrick, Whitten and Coggan (2013) 
point to the case of a series of droughts in the Colorado River Basin, which, while prompting 
minor reforms that allowed for more flexible markets, also resulted in maladaptive 
“infrastructure investments and water-use patterns that reinforced powerful vested interests and 
raised the costs of future institutional transitions” (p. 202).  
Overbuilding infrastructure may also be constrained by the limited ability to supply new 
water at any price. As additional projects hit hard resource limits that no feasible dams or 
pipelines could overcome, access to additional water through institutional change will be more 
attractive. Unfortunately, designing institutions that can evolve with changing circumstances 
may be an especially difficult task when institutional change requires buy-in from powerful 
interests with an incentive to become vested in the new institutional arrangement. In light of this, 
policymakers should be especially careful to avoid destroying existing institutions and 
organizations that successfully adapt to water scarcity. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The colonizers of the American West were faced with tremendous geographic, climatic, 
and institutional challenges that forced them to repeatedly innovate new institutions and forms of 
governance, first from riparian rights to prior appropriation, and then from prior appropriation to 
irrigation companies. Those regions with the most water scarcity, and therefore the most to gain 
from trade, internalized the transaction costs of prior appropriation to a greater extent. Irrigators 
organized to solve the collective action problems of water trade, creating vibrant markets that 
allow water to be freely traded between agricultural users, but some of these same organizations, 
primarily irrigation districts, have evolved into special interest groups that prevent water from 
being traded to more valuable urban uses. This paper offers evidence that institutional adaptation 
in water resources is associated with water scarcity. As a growing population and changing 
climate continue to affect water scarcity, allowing for continued adaptation will be crucial to 
using water resources efficiently. 
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